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AUTHORS' MORAL RIGHTS AND THE COPYRIGHT
LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE'S REPORT:
W(H)ITHER SUCH RIGHTS NOW?
DAVID VAVER*

INTRODUCTION
In 1928, the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works of 1886
was amended to include a new Article 6bis, which provided that, independently of their copyright or economic rights, authors should enjoy rights of
paternity and integrity in respect of their works: the right "to claim authorship" and the right "to object to any distortion, mutiliation or other modification" of their work that would be prejudicial to their honour or reputation.
These rights underpinned the concept of droij morc~l(so-called "moral right"),
long recognized by a number of Continental European countries. The international recognition of these rights was widely accepted as the principal
achievement of the 1928 revision of the Convention. The rights were reinforced in later revisions of the Convention, so that Article 6bis of the 1971
Paris text, which Australia has ratified, now extends the right of integrity
to "other derogatory action in relation to" copyright works and encourages
countries to adopt a period of protection at least coterminous with
copyright1.
In September 1984, having been requested by the Attorney General of the
Commonwealth to inquire into moral rights, the Copyright Law Review Committee published a Discussion Paper on Moral Rights. It invited interested
persons to make submissions, particularly on ten issues the Committee
thought were of special importance. The issues were comprehensive: Should
all or any of the moral rights recognised elsewhere be protected in Australia
beyond the protection currently afforded by Australian law? Should protection extend to all items covered by copyright, or only some? What should
be the scope and duration of protection? Should the protection be included
*Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York Univers~ty,Toronto; Visiting Professor
and Exchange Scholar, Faculty of Law, Monash University, 1988.
The other major copyright treaty by which Australia is bound, the Universal Copyright Convention signed in Geneva in 1952, does not expressly protect moral rights. However, it has
been recently argued that the U.C.C.'s requirement that states must grant "adequate and
effective protection" for authors' rights may now, or at least in the very near future, require
protection to be extended to authors' moral rights: since states must protect those rights recognized by "civilized countries" and since most such countries now recognize moral rights, the
remainder must therefore similarly provide such protection: Dietz, "Elements of moral right
protection in the Universal Copyright Convention" (1987) Vol. 21 No. 3 Copyright Bulletin
17, at 22-3. The theory, and hence Dietz's conclusion from it, is controversial: see Vaver,
"The National Treatment Requirements of the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions:
Part Two" (1986) 17 IIC 715, at 729 ff.
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in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth.) or in separate legislation? Could the rights
be waived or otherwise lost, e.g., when the work was commercialised? Should
the rights prevail over heritage and town planning legislation? What remedies
should be available and who should resolve moral rights questions, the courts
or another tribunal?
After receiving and considering over 40 submissions, the Committee
produced its Report on Moral Rights, dated January 1988 and released in
March 1988. It was not unanimous. A majority of five of the nine members
recommended that no legislation conferring moral rights on authors should
be enacted. A variety of reasons were given: enactment would give rise to
a number of serious practical problems; the theoretical basis for moral rights
protection in a common law system "has not been identified"; there was
insufficient pressure for enactment from authors themselves; few important
moral rights violations occur in Australia; and the Australian community
generally was unlikely to endorse moral rights laws.2 In contrast to the
25-page majority report, a four-person minority produced a 69-page report,
with a further 13 pages of footnotes, recommending that moral rights
protection should indeed be included in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth.), and
indicating what form such legislation should take.3
It would be a pity if Australia's policy on moral rights were to be settled
in accord with the majority's conclusion. The majority report contains simply
too many contradictions and unsupportable statements to carry conviction.
Tom Brown said of his tutor: "I d o not love thee, Dr Fell,/The reason why
I cannot tell;" and this doggerel ultimately epitomises the majority's reaction
to moral rights. T o disprove the majority case does not, of course, prove
the truth of the minority's; and, indeed, not all of the minority's reasoning
supporting the legislative introduction of moral rights is sound. However,
a combination of those valid reasons provided by the minority and of other
considerations raised by neither report does go to establish the case for which
the minority argues.
THE PURPOSE OF MORAL RIGHTS
It is obviously important to understand what purposes moral rights serve.
The Committee majority indeed took the minority to task for failing to
propose "a consistent theoretical base" for the doctrine, beyond a vaguely
defined notion that some dealings with copyright works involved some
The majority may be right to some extent,
"unfairness or impr~priety".~
although one might have thought that a demonstrated systematic "unfairness or impropriety" itself provided a ready basis for legislative action. The
majority rightly pointed out that foreign jurisdictions have adopted differ-

3

Copyright Law Review Committee, Report on Moral Rights (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra), January 1988. The majority's summary of recommendations
appears at p.10.
Id., at pp.35-39, where the minority's reasons for its conclusion and its recommendations
are summarized.
Id., at pp.19-20.
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ent models for their moral rights legislation, but then goes on to suggest that
moral rights doctrine is therefore so confused that, on this ground alone,
Australia should refuse to have anything to do with it. This is nonsense: is
it a valid reason for deciding not to compensate victims of personal injuries
in Australia that there are many different models, with quite different theoretical bases even in common law countries, for compensating such victims?
Moreover, if the absence of a consistent theoretical base were a reason for
criticizing the introduction or continuation of legislation, much current legislation including copyright law itselfS would be in jeopardy - a logic that
the Committee majority studiously avoided pursuing!
Rather than our chasing the chimera of "a consistent theoretical base",
it seems preferable to consider the point instrumentally: what purposes do
moral rights serve? We should not be surprised to find that, without other
supporting measures, such goals may be only imperfectly attained; but this
is so of virtually any legal doctrine considered in isolation.
According to Continental jurists, moral rights are justified on the basis
of the close personal link between an author or artist and his or her work.
The work emanates from and is an extension of the author. Just as any
interference with the author's body is an assault, so any interference with
the author's work is an assault on the work's, and hence the author's, integrity.
Moral rights assure the author that the work is communicated to the public
in the form the author intended. Continental systems classify the rights as
personal, rather than proprietary; after the author's death, however, they
may in some countries be exercised by the heirs or by a governmental body
dedicated to the preservation of the country's cultural heritage.6
This rather metaphysical conception of moral rights, with its idealist view
of art and literature, may be useful as taxonomy but does not adequately
explain the purpose of the rights, even in Continental systems of law. To
equate mutilation of art and literature with maiming is a picturesque
metaphor, but little more: chopping paintings is in fact different from chopping bodily parts and could fairly attract different social and legal responses.
In fact, the growth of moral rights thinking in Europe at the end of the 18th
and the beginning of the 19th centuries coincided with the growing economic
independence of authors and artists, whose shackles of ecclesiastic, royal and
seigneurial patronage had been loosened after the French revolution. In
England, also, the snobbery that said gentle folk did not write for money
began collapsing too: if a poet as dedicated to his art as Byron could, without
corrupting his muse, accept substantial sums from his publisher, perhaps

See, e.g., (now Judge) Breyer, "The Uneasy Case for Copyright" (1970) 84 Harv. L.R. 281,
who finds little justification for copyright on either economic or non-economic grounds.
6 See generally, Strauss, "The Moral Right of the Author" (1959), Study No. 4 prepared for
the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyright of the U.S. Senate Committee
on thp Judiciary (86th Cong., 1st Sess.), 114; Stromholm, Le Droit Moral de /'Auteur en
Droit allemand, frangais et scandinave (Stockholm, 1967); Karlen, "Moral Rights in California"
(1982) 19 San Diego L.Rev. 675; Da Silva, "Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright" (1980)
28 Bull. Copr. Soc.. 1.
5
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doing creative work for a living was all right for lesser mortals too.'
Creative people started behaving more and more like entrepreneurs: they
needed to sell their works, to build up a reputation with their public, and
so to increase the sales of their current and future works. For the most part,
however, they did not accumulate the power and resources of entrepreneurs,
but relied on middlemen publishers and, later, art dealers and film producers
to commercialize their works.8 Standard form contracts, drawn up by the
entrepreneurs to give themselves as much leeway as possible in publishing
the work, eventually became the norm: only best-selling authors and artists
had much power to insist on contract modifications to protect their own
interests better. Sometimes creative people joined to form a union to advance
their interests, but few collectives gained any significant power. In addition,
a sea change has occurred in public opinion about the preservation of
mankind's cultural heritage. What was considered acceptable in the early
nineteenth century, the elginisme that resulted in the desecration of the Parthenon and which led to the modern feud between Britain and Greece concerning the fate of the marbles resting in the British Museum, has given way to
international and national policies designed to keep art treasures i n t a ~ t . ~
This suggests that moral rights rest on a number of bases that are more
plausible than those dealing with metaphysical or idealistic notions of artists
and art. The first basis is economic: moral rights are one form of truth-inmarketing legislation. The public is entitled to be told the truth about a work's
authorshiplo and is entitled to have the work in the form the author intended it to reach his or her public. This closely parallels the public interest function of a trade mark: people rely on marks as an assurance of a certain quality and are willing to pay more for a marked product than a generic brand.]]
The mark owner can prevent goods bearing its mark from being sold or

' This did not mean that 19th century authors were generally able to live off the fruits of their
writing. Most needed support from formal institutions (e.g., in England, the Royal Literary
Fund) or informal institutions, e.g., patrons including other successful writers. In The Common
Writer: Life in Nineteenth Century Grub Street (Cambridge U.P., 1985), Nigel Cross states
of this period: "[Tlhe calamities of authors are the natural consequence of writing for a living.
Few activities other than gambling are so risky . . . As major writers are one in a thousand,
999 people had to find ways and means of surviving as writers to enable a Dickens or a George
Eliot to emerge from their ranks". (id., at 5-6)
A survey of English writers in the mid 1960s revealed that half of those writing full time
earned less than the minimum pay of a bus driver. Even the "most prolific and businesslike"
major writer may end up earning less than the literary agent he employs: James Hepburn,
The Author's Empty Purse and the Rise of the Literary Agent (Oxford U.P., 1%8), at 100 ff.
Similar relativity may be expected in the other creative arts: e.g., the modern art dealer stands
very much in the position of patron to the artists whose work he handles: E.B. Feldman,
The Artist (Prentice-Hall, 1982), at 186 ff.
Merryman, "Thinking about the Elgin Marbles" (1985) 83 Michigan L.R. 1880. See also Bator,
"An Essay on the International Trade in Art" (1982) 34 Stanford L.R. 275.
lo This does not prevent the well-known and accepted practice of anonymous and pseudonymous publication. Just like a trade mark owner or, for that matter, any corporation, the
author is entitled to choose under what name he wishes to be publicly or professionally known,
or whether he wants to be known at all. The public entitlement is to receive the communication credited as the author intended.
'I Schechter, "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection" (1927) 40 Harv. L.R. 813.
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perceived with modifications not authorized by the mark owner.'* Similarly, the choices that consumers of art, literature, music and drama exercise
about what they wish to read or see depend upon whether or not they react,
or have in the past reacted, favourably to a creator's work or his or her general
repute: this assessment can be made fairly only if consumers have accurate
information about the work and the author available to them. Thus, moral
rights help to create and maintain a market in which consumer choice is more
accurately channelled.
Secondly, the public interest in the functioning of the market in creative
works coincides with the author's own interest in gaining the due reward the
market is willing to confer on his or her product. Creative people want their
name to come before the public13 and their works to be perceived as they
intended. The more an author's fame increases, the more popular his work
becomes and the more marketable become his future works.14 The converse
is true if the author's work does not meet public acclaim. And so it should
be. Having entered the marketplace, the author has to accept its risks. His
or her works and name may become known, and the author will prosper;
they may remain unknown or become known and shunned, and the author
will languish. These are the economics of fame, and common law courts everywhere have recognized them in moral rights-type disputes.15
Thirdly, creative people generally are not in as strong a bargaining position as the entrepreneurs with whom they have to deal in order to gain a
market for their works.I6 Without moral rights, authors have nothing to
Illustrated Newspapers Ltd v. Publicitv Services Ltd [I 9381 Ch. 414; A . C . Spark Plug Co.
v. Canadian Spark Plug Service [I 9351 3 I). L. R. 84 (Exch. Ct .); Associated Newspapers P. L.C .
v. Insert Media Ltd (19881 I W.L.R. 909, 511 (Ch. D.).
'"here
are obvious exceptions, both ancient and modern. Thus, the Carrefour Press was
founded in the early 1930s to advance th notion of complete anonymity in the arts. It claimed,
in an anonymous pamphlet titled "Anor yrnous: The Need for Anonymity", that writing for
an audience distorted the purity of art towards commercial ends. Despite its credo, the Press
ironically ended up having to discard the principles it avowed through lack of author support: see Hugh Ford, Published in Paris (Macmillan, 1975). 290-7. For a contrary view on
anonymity, see Anthony Trollope, "On Anonymous Literature" (1862) 1 Fortnightly Review
491: "A man should always dare to be responsible for the work which he does . . . ."
l4 Thus, in Hepworth Mfg. Co. Ltd v. Ryott [I9201 1 Ch. 1 (C.A.), a film studio unsuccessfully tried to stop one of its former stzrs using his stage name with a new employer. The
evidence was that the new employer was paying the actor twice the f 10 per week of his old
employ, while his salary under a new narle would be £7 until he could establish a new identity
and goodwill.
l 5 Thus, the High Court of Australia in Associated Newspapers Ltd v. Bancks (1 95 1) 83 C.L.R.
322, at 338, approvingly quoted from dhddard J . in Tolnay v. Criterion Film Prodrrction
Ltd 119361 2 All E.R. 1625, at 1526-7 (K.B.D.):"All persons who have to make a living by
attracting the public to their works, be t ey artists in the sense of painters or be they literary
men who write books or who perform in other branches of the arts, such as pianists and

section.
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bargain about. Even with moral rights, authors are not assured of furthering their interests: at a time when moral rights were thought not to exist in
the United States, the boilerplate of standard form contracts in the movie
industry included a moral rights waiver clause." Granting authors moral
rights will perhaps not remedy such abuses, but at least the prima facie
presence of such rights will engage the court's jurisdiction to monitor waiver
clauses for restraint of trade, unconscionability, undue influence and the
various other devices available at common law or equity to remedy abuse
of bargaining power. l 8
Fourthly, the modern movement to secure the preservation of man's
cultural heritage is furthered by moral rights legislation. People are now more
and more recognizing the importance, to themselves and to future generations, of providing and maintaining a record of current cultural achievements
and of trying to reconstruct those of the past. As Merryman puts it:
[Mlonuments of human culture [are] an essential part of our common past.
They tell us who we are and where we came from, give us cultural
identity.19
Strong moral rights legislation helps to attain these goals by co-opting those
persons with a strong vested interest in a work - the author and his or her
heirs - to keep intermeddlers at bay. The granting of a private right of action
to further policies of general public interest is hardly novel: witness section
52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.), where the desirable goal of purifying the marketplace of deceptive and misleading trade practices is furthered
by providing traders with civil actions against competing miscreants.
Admittedly, giving a private person the power to champion the public weal
is, without more, not the most effective means of attaining a public interest
goal. And, since moral rights, on one model, are merely coterminous with
copyright, they become ineffective as a work gets older: the matter will then
be left to contemporary public senstivity or, less likely in an era of avowed
governmental dislike of bureaucracy, a cultural commission charged with
monitoring moral rights abuses as part of a mandate of heritage preservation.
at 119 ff. Moreover, before the copyright revisions in the U.S., U.K., Australia and New
Zealand that occurred in the two decades after 1956, the copyright laws of those countries
recognized this inferior bargaining position by provisions reverting copyright to the author
or his heirs for the last part of the term. See ChappeN & Co. Ltd v. Redwood Music Co.
Ltd [I9801 2 All E.R. 817, at 824 (H.L.); Ringer, "Renewal of Copyright" in Studies on
Copyrrght (Fisher memorial ed., 1960):"author-publisher contracts must frequently be made
at a time when the value of the work is unknown or conjectural and the author (regardless
of his business ability) is necessarily in a poor bargaining position." The provision still exists
in the Canadian Copyright Act R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, s.12(5) in the same form as it appeared
in the Copyright Act 1911 (U.K.). The elimination of the reversionary provisions in these
countries was not prompted by any evidence that the imbalance of bargaining power between
authors and copyright acquirers had mysteriously vanished.
See the clause in Harris v. Twentieth Century Fox Frlm Corp. (1943) 139 F.2d 571.
See Vaver, "Authors' Moral Rights - Reform Proposals in Canada: Charter or Barter of
Rights for Creators?" (1988) 25 Osgoode Hall L. J. 000 (forthcoming). Of course, a jurisdiction serious about furthering the policies of moral rights would ensure that the rights were
neither assignable nor waivable, as the Australian Copyright Council indeed has pointed out:
"Moral Rights", Bulletin No. 50 (1984). at 15, suggesting the mediating concept of a "reasonable" moral right.
19 Supra note 9, at 1895.
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Thus, the realistic choice is between doing nothing and doing something,
however attenuated.
THE CASE AGAINST MORAL RIGHTS
We shall now turn to the principal reasons that the Committee majority
gave for refusing to recommend moral rights legislation.
(a) Australia's international obligations
The majority stated that the only basis upon which it could be persuaded
to recommend moral rights legislation would be that "Australia's continuing
membership of the Berne Convention so requires". It summarily concluded
that the Berne Convention requires n o fi~rtherprotection than Australia
already gives.*O The minority disagreed, claiming the Convention requires
members to provide positive moral rights, not merely to allow authors to
assert such rights. It went on to say that the patchwork of common law and
statutory rules that could be enlisted in aid of moral rights was too incidental and fragmentary to amount to compliance with the C o n ~ e n t i o n . ~ ~
The strength of the majority's position is that it is difficult to disprove.
The International Court of Justice, which has jurisdiction over the Berne
Convention, has never had any dispute on the Convention brought to it. The
prospect of any moral rights dispute being thus authoritatively decided is
bleak. In addition, despite a strong trend of academic opinion that Australia is or may be in breach of its Berne obligation^,^^ the Committee
majority has a number of strong points on its side. First, both Britain and
Australia took an active part at the 1928 Berne Conference in settling the
present form of Article 6bis, avowedly to conform with their domestic
common law, and the Rapporteur ~ e n e r a himself
l
noted his opinion that
the sources of moral rights protection in English law were the principles of
common law and equity, as supplemented by statute law, without indicating
that such protection did not meet the requirements of the new Article.23 The
U.K. government more recently has thought that moral rights legislation was
necessary in order to comply with the Paris 1971 text of the C o n v e n t i ~ n , ~ "
but the Whitford Copyright Committee, which recommended such changes,
was not prepared to go that far.25 Most recently, a report prepared for the
Report, supra note 2, at 11.
Id., at 62 ff.
22 The minority report sets out the writing which supports its position: id., at 50 ff.
22 Union Internationale pour la Protection des Oeuvres Litteraires et Artistiques, Actes de la
Conference reunie a Rome du 7 mai au 2 juin 1928 (Berne 1929). at 283, n.2 (Stromholm,
supra note 6, vol. 1, at 427, agrees in principle but is unprepared to say whether or not common
law protection is adequate). The Rapporteur indeed singles out the Australian delegate, Sir
William Moore, and praises his "high legal skills" in overcoming the initial textual difficulties t o produce the Article in its current form: id., at 201.
24 S. Ricketson, The Law of Intellectual Property (Law Book Co., 1984), para. 15.80, who
apparently agrees.
25 Report of the Committee to consider the Law on Copyright and Designs (H.M.S.O. London,
1977), Cmnd. 6732, para. 53. The Committee did think that the U.K. was in default on the
obligations t o provide that moral rights be coterminous with copyright. However, Article
20
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U.S. State Department has claimed that the U.S.'s mixture of statute and
common law protects moral rights sufficiently for the U.S. to be able to adhere
to the 1971 Paris text of the Berne Convention, relying on the similar position of Australia whose "adherence to Berne is unchallenged".*6
Without a more extensive inquiry than is possible in this paper, the fairest
verdict that can be reached on the Committee majority's opinion on this point
is, except in some respect^,^' "Not Disproven". But the Committee's terms
of reference simply asked it whether or not legislative protection for moral
rights was "needed''.28 A finding that Australia presently complies with its
treaty obligations far from answers this question.
(b) Moral rights are inconsistent with a common law system
In the light of what has just been said, the Committee majority's claim
that moral rights are "alien" and "foreign" to "a common law system"29 is
nothing short of astonishing.
First, it falsifies the assertions made by the Australian delegation to the
1928 Rome revision of the Berne Conference, that the wording of Article
6bis as finalized created no difficulties for its system of copyright and common
law.30 The Committee majority fails to point out any development since
1928 that undercuts the validity of those assertions, which moreover were
shared by Britain and the other Empire delegates at the Conference3' and
which were never repudiated at any later Berne conference.
Secondly, the majority's claim contradicts its major premise: that Australia already protects moral rights sufficiently for it to be in compliance with
the Berne Convention. If this is true, such rights logically cannot be alien
or foreign to Australia's legal system. The only valid claim that can be made,
consistent with that premise, is that any increase in the level of existing moral
rights protection would be antithetical to Australia's legal system. But this
much less grandiose assertion is no more valid than its bigger brother.
Thirdly, the majority ignores the fact that copyright itsew is historically
alien to a common law system. I t needed legislation to set up a copyright
system, since it was settled long ago that copyright in published works did
not exist at common law. The Committee majority is certainly not asserting
6bis(2) of the 1971 Paris text does allow exceptions from this position, and the Whitford
Committee did not discuss whether the U.K. could technically take advantage of these
exceptions.
'Vreliminary Report of the Ad H o c Working Group on U.S. Adherence to Berne Convention, December 1985 (1986) 33Jo. Cop. Soc. U.S.A. 183, at 214-5. The Report notes at 215
the opinion of Arpad Bogsch, the director of the World intellectual Property Organization,
which administers the Berne Convention, that statute and common law may combine to fulfill
the obligation of Article 66;s.
Passing off, widely touted as the principal common law action available t o authors having
moral rights grievances, may not always be available. Two of its prerequisites, that the plaintiff
have a business and that the work have a goodwill and reputation capable of injury, will
be difficult of proof for struggling authors with little repertoire to their credit.
LX Report, supra note 2, at p.1.
'Y Id., at p.27.
"' Supra note 23.
Id., at pp.238-9 of the Conference proceedings.
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that copyright exists as a matter of natural right, for to do so would automatically admit the case for moral rights.
Fourthly, if the majority means to suggest that moral rights cannot exist
in any common law system, it is simply wrong. Without being definitive, one
may point out that India has had moral rights legislation since 1957,32Israel
introduced it in 1981,33and Canada has had it since 1931!34Even before
then, the Chief Justice of Canada had, in an appeal from Ontario, a common law province, stated that moral rights were part of the common law,
as much as they were part of the civil law of Quebec.35 Indeed, perhaps
paradoxically, the first Canadian case vindicating an artist's statutory moral
rights was decided not in Quebec but in Ontario, where the judge in his
discretion issued a mandatory interlocutory injunction requiring a defendant
to remove material distorting a s~ulpture.3~
The most recent Copyright Bill
introduced in the United Kingdom contains extensive provisions dealing with
moral rights of integrity and paternity.37 The current Copyright Act 1956
(U.K.) already contains limited provisions dealing with misattribution, an
aspect of the right of paternity, upon which similar provisions in Australia
and New Zealand are based.38 In the United States, California and New
York have passed statutes providing for moral rights for visual artists.39
Moreover, a U.S. federal court of appeals in 1976 said, in a case involving
a successful moral rights claim for mutilating, of all things, a "Monty Python"
television programme:
American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral
rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks
to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors.
Nevertheless, the economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation
that serves as the foundation for American copyright law [citations] cannot be reconciled with the inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the public on which the artists
are financially dependent. Thus courts have long granted relief for misrepresentation of an artist's work by relying on theories outside the statutory law of copyright, such as contract law [citation] or the tort of unfair
competition [citation]. Although such decisions are clothed in terms of
proprietary right in one's creation, they also properly vindicate the author's
personal right to prevent the presentation of his work to the public in a
distorted form. [citations140
Copyright Act 1957, s.57 (India). See Smt. Bhandari v. Kala Vikos Pictures Pvt. Ltd [I9871
All India Reports (Delhi) 13.
33 Copyright Ordinance (Amendment No. 4) Law 5741-1981, s.3, inserting new s.4a: see (19811
Copyright 269.
34 Now Copyright Act R.S.C. 1970, C. C-30, S. 12(7). For discussion of the Act, see Vaver,
"Authors' Moral Rights in Canada" (1983) 14 I.I.C. 329. Canada has recently expanded these
provisions by the Copyright Amendment Act 1988 (Can.), S.C. 1986-87-88, c. 15.
35 Morang v. Le Sueur (1911) 45 S.C.R. 95, at 97-98, per Fitzpatrick C.J.C.
36 Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd (1982) 70 C.P.R.(2d) 105 (Ont. H.C.). For comment, see
Vaver, "Snow v. The Eaton Centre: Wreaths on Sculpture Prove Accolade for Artists' Moral
Rights" (1983) 8 Can. Business Law Jo. 81.
37 Copyright, Designs and Patents Bill 1987 (H.L.), Chapter IV.
38 The Australian provisions are found in the Copyright Act 1968, ss.190 and 191.
39 For comment on the California statute, see Karlen, supra note 6.
40 (1976) 192 U.S.P.Q. 1, at 8-9 (C.A., 2nd Circ.).
32
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Thus, in the United Kingdom, Canada, India, Israel, and the United States
in both state and federal jurisdiction, either courts or legislatures or both
have recognised that moral rights can be, and indeed have been, successfully
integrated into a common law system. And Australia, like the United Kingdom and New Zealand, already has integrated a partial right of paternity
into its copyright law, without any strain on the common law system of any
of these jurisdictions being perceptible.
If the majority meant to present the more limited and more overtly
xenophobic claim that such rights were "alien" or "foreign" to Australia's
common law system, it signally failed to present any features that differentiated the Australian common law system from those of similar federal jurisdictions, such as the United States, Canada and India, or from the fount
of common law systems, England. The implicit assertion that Australians
value their property rights and resent any interference with them more
intensely than any other subjects in a common law system is undocumented
and seems totally implausible.
In truth, in the sense that the majority seems to use the term "alien" or
"foreign", moral rights are foreign to any legal system, common law or civil
law, socialist or capitalist. The institution of private property is as firmly
entrenched in France and Germany as it is in England or the United States;
yet the two former jurisdictions have strong moral rights laws which can
impinge on the unfettered enjoyment of certain kinds of private property.
In Canada, private property is just as important in the civil law province
of Quebec as in the common law provinces; nor is the position in Louisiana
any different in this respect from other U.S. states. Socialist legal systems
have moral rights firmly embedded in their laws; one might expect that
individual assertions of such rights there might contradict notions that the
community interest ought generally to prevail over that of the individual.
At bottom, the majority's view should be treated for what it is: little more
than an echo of some idealized pre-industrial golden age of T ~ r y i s m . ~ ~
(c) Australians would not accept or respect moral rights
The Committee majority claimed that Australians would neither understand nor, if understanding, accept limitations "on a person's use of his or
her personal tangible property that are based upon another individual's perception of interest in that property".42 This claim is nowhere substantiated.
Indeed, other claims made by the report cut down the width of this claim.
Thus, the majority admits that "most" Australians would, and presumably
do, recognize the right of paternity, by crediting authors whose work they
reproduce.43 They therefore both understand and accept this right. Therefore, the Committee majority must think that legislating paternity rights
*I
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Cons~derthis revealing statement from the Committee majority: "The need to keep regulation to a minimum (and to reduce existing regulation) appears to be accepted by all major
pol~tlcalparties and by the community as a whole." Report, supra note 2, at p.22.
Id., at p.27.
Id., at pp. 26, 28.
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would cause Australians to change their habits and now perform wrongful
acts. Why people would choose to act so perversely is not explained.
Moreover, the majority cited no evidence for either its broader or narrower view that Australians do not understand and would not accept legislation on moral rights or some aspect of moral rights. There was no survey
indicating Australians' attitudes on these questions, nor was it suggested that
moral rights principles were beyond public comprehension. The majority's
view seems little more than presumption. Politicians, more expert than most
in gauging the public pulse on any issue, feel lucky if they get it right half
the time. How a bare majority of a copyright law committee, neither representative of the public nor expert in practical or theoretical political science,
thought it accurately felt the public pulse remains a mystery. The majority
dredges up picayune examples of actual or potential moral rights infringements, and imagines that the public would react against such claims.44But,
like any reductio ad absurdum, this line of reasoning has its weaknesses. Thus,
the majority seems to think that artists, complaining about their works being
inadequately displayed, will go to court any time their demands are unmet.
(Whether or not the artist has a genuine grievance does not seem to concern
the majority.) But trivial complaints in moral rights cases are subject to the
de minimis rule, with expensive consequences for complainant^.^^ The direct
and indirect costs of litigation are now so high everywhere that most complaints are either settled out of court or ignored; only where the perceived
benefits of a successful result outweigh these costs will a case be pursued.
Moreover, some people (perhaps not quite as many as the Committee majority
imagines) might think that a sculptor should not be able to stop the operators of a shopping mall, which owns the sculpture, from festooning the work
with Christmas wreaths46 or any other decoration they feel like whenever
they want. But would the public which pours in to see a Sidney Nolan
exhibition accept with as much equanimity the sight of the artist's works
decorated with jolly little red gnomes sitting among the gum-trees, because
the current owner of the works thought that his over-painting would liven
up the landscapes? People's reactions to the modification of art works are
inextricably bound up with their appreciation of the initial work. To admit
Nolan's right to prevent the owner of one of his paintings from publicly
exhibiting it in a distorted form is to admit that other artists of lesser fame
should have the same right.
But the Committee majority's appeal to public sentiment is really just a
red herring. If individual consumers were really interested about moral rights,
one would have expected them or organisations representing them to have

45

Id., at 14-15; 23-24. The Report also suggests that there are so many different sorts of cases
in which moral rights claims could be made that there are insuperable difficulties in covering
such areas. But this has not been the experience in any common law jurisdiction with a moral
rights statute, whether drafted broadly as in Canada or in great detail as in California and
(now) the U.K. 1987 bill (see supra note 37). Practical difficulties do and will arise in moral,
rights cases, but they are solved as in any other area of the law: in the vast majority of cases,
negotiation, and in a tiny minority, litigation.
Crocker v. Papunya Tula Artists Pty Ltd (1985) 61 A.L.R. 529 (Fed. Ct.).
Contrary to the result in Snow's case, supra note 36.
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made submissions to the committee. But not one consumer or consumer
organisation did so. This parallels experience elsewhere. Most individuals
care little about moral rights, because they do not see the issue as affecting
them. The vast majority does not own anything that would attract a moral
rights suit. Those few people who do own valuable art works will not paint
gnomes on them and cannot conceive of any other rational person doing so
either. Most such people are or fancy themselves connoisseurs, who know
better than to tamper with such works or who suspect, quite rightly, that
tampering will reduce the work's value.
The "public" about whom the majority is really talking is a quite different
public, that of institutional dealers in copyright works: media entrepreneurs,
museums, art galleries and dealers, and the like. Now, this "public" might
indeed view with alarm any attempt to interfere with its power over creative
works and might indeed try to mobilise the larger public to share its opinion.
But experience elsewhere indicates that the fears of these institutions are unjustified. commercial life goes on without substantial hindrance in strong
moral rights countries as it does in countries with weak or no moral rights.
All that happens in the former is that the author or artist, who has not validly
waived his or her moral rights, is admitted to have some say in how a work
is later exploited. The spectre of the obstinate author habitually making
unreasonable demands is as much a caricature as the spectre of the habitually
deforming entrepreneur. As in most spheres of social life, compromises are
made and agreements are reached, because the parties recognise and respect
their mutual interdependence.
(d) Miscellaneous Difficulties
A number of other points are made in the majority report, which may
be considered more briefly.
The majority claimed that the creative community as a whole showed
insufficient interest in moral rights and that very few justifiable cases of
infringements of such rights had been dem~nstrated.~'
What constitutes
sufficient pressure and how one finds out what moral rights grievances are
occurring in a community are debatable points. Industry pressure is obviously
more concentrated and organized than the pressure that authors and their
organisations can bring to bear on an issue. But, the majority failed to recognize that not only Australian creators are affected. Under the Berne Convention, foreign authors are entitled to assert moral rights here, and there
is no indication that they or their representative organisations were called
on to make submissions. This failure of natural justice in itself is enough
to vitiate the majority's assertion. In any event, some might argue that the
political process has failed if it refuses to redress a justifiable grievance of
even one of its citizens. The Committee majority's relegation of such
grievances to the realm of education and "community protests and
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Report, supra note 2, at 20, 26.
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pressures"48 is nothing more than a cynical attempt to reduce the creative
community to a fringe group in society. Authors deserve better than this.
Who should judge infringements of moral rights, the regular courts or some
specialised tribunal such as the Copyright Tribunal, is not a question of central
importance. The majority's claim that judges would find such cases
difficult49is perhaps true, but Australian judges are called on to dispose of
much more difficult cases than these. In cases involving art and literature,
past experience indicates that they have managed to combine sensitivity with
robust common sense.50To suggest that moral rights cases are not justiciable is demonstrably wrong, in the light of the experience in foreign
jurisdictions.
Another reason the Committee majority dredges up to bolster its case
against moral rights is that copyright owners have a difficult enough job in
persuading the public not to infringe copyright in certain cases; how much
more difficult it would be to persuade the public not to infringe moral
rights!51 This argument has been partly answered already: the public that
is photocopying and home-taping is not likely to be the same public whom
authors would take to task over moral rights infringement^;^^ nor would the
people seeking to enforce moral rights - authors and the like - necessarily
be the same as the copyright owners. In any event, the Committee majority
chooses to ignore the issues of comparative morality involved here. Is there
no moral difference between a person buying a record and making a tape
of it to avoid scratches on the disc (copyright infringement!) and one who
"improves" a Nolan painting by painting gnomes on it? A report that would
give the copyright owner a cause of action in the first case and Nolan no
right whatsoever in the second demonstrates its own moral sterility.
CONCLUSION
Hugh Collins recently asserted that "the mental universe of Australian
politics is essentially Benthamite" and that "[flor practitioners and observers
alike, the compelling proofs of a political proposal in Australia are the twin
utilitarian standards of efficacy (will it work?) and plurality (have you got
the number^?)."^^ The Copyright Law Review Committee's majority Report
on Moral Rights is an example of Collins' phenomenon in the copyright field.
Issues of justice and morality become subservient to expedience and niggardly
Id., at 17, 29-30. Is it any wonder, then, that Leonie Kramer talks of the "air of fragility
about the creative arts in Australia, evidenced partly by a certain defensiveness in artists"?
Kramer, "The Media, Society, and Culture" (1985) 114 Daedalus 293, at 304.
49 Id., at 16-17.
50 See, e.g., the Bancks case, supra note 15 and A. G. v. Trustees of National Art Gallery of
N.S. W. (1945) 62 W.N.(N.S.W.) 212, for a sensitive concern to the problems of artists; cf.
Crocker, supra note 45, for a robust application of de minimis.
5' Report, supra note 2, at 28.
52 Text supra following note 46.
53 Collins, "Political Ideology in Australia: The Distinctiveness of a Benthamite Society" (1985)
114 Daedalus 147, at 148, 156.
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positivism. That this attitude appears in the work of a specialised law reform
committee, supposed to be far removed spiritually from the hurly-burly of
political debate, is all the more amazing.
Australian policy should not be formulated on the basis of the majority
Report. Experience in jurisdictions with similar legal systems to Australia
has shown that moral rights can be a positive force in a country's culture,
not something to be feared and distrusted. The only entities that have anything
to fear from moral rights are the occasional institutions who, in dealing with
creative works, believe that what is good for them is also good for Australia. They should be put in their place.
The minority Report supplies the basis of a working model for moral rights
legislation. It may not be perfect. But if the government decides to adopt
the policy of protecting moral rights through legislation, the contours of such
legislation find a ready shape in that part of the Report.

